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ABSTRACT
Prior research has uncovered a large and positive correlation between education and health. This
paper examines whether education has a causal impact on health. I follow synthetic cohorts using
successive U.S. censuses to estimate the impact of educational attainment on mortality rates. I use
compulsory education laws from 1915 to 1939 as instruments for education. The results suggest that
education has a causal impact on mortality, and that this effect is perhaps larger than has been previously






alleras@princeton.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Access to health care insurance,1 e x p e n d i t u r e so nh e a l t hc a r e , 2 a n de v e ni n c o m el e v e l s 3 have been
shown to have little eﬀect on health. On the other hand, there is a large and positive correlation
between education and health (Grossman and Kaestner 1997). This correlation is strong and
signiﬁcant even after controlling for diﬀerent measures of socio-economic status, such as income
and race, and regardless of how health is measured (morbidity rates, self-reported health status
or other measures of health). Given that the measured eﬀects of education are large, investments
in education might prove to be a cost-eﬀective means of achieving better health,4 if education
indeed helps us to be healthier. But prior research has not ascertained whether the relationship
between education and health is causal.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether education has a causal eﬀect on health,
in particular on mortality. The negative relationship between education and mortality, the most
basic measure of health, has become well established since the famous Kitagawa and Hauser
(1973) study, which found signiﬁcant diﬀerences in mortality rates across educational categories
for both sexes. More recent studies (e.g. Christenson and Johnson, 1995, Deaton and Paxson,
1999) conﬁrm these ﬁndings. Elo and Preston (1996) control for a variety of other mortality
factors such as income, race, marital status, region of residence, and region of birth. Rogers et
al. (2000) further control for access to health care, insurance, smoking, exercise, occupation, and
other factors. Figures 1 and 2 document this relationship using consecutive census data for the
US: in all cohorts, those who survive have higher education than those who do not.
The existing literature has explained this correlation in three ways. One controversial hypoth-
esis is that education increases health, either because education makes people better decision-
1 See Newhouse (1993).
2 For example see Filmer and Prichett (1997).
3 Grossman (1975) shows that income does not aﬀect health beyond a certain threshold.
4 This was ﬁrst suggested by Auster et al (1969).
1makers (Grossman 1975) and/or because more educated people have better information about
health (Kenkel 1991, Rosenzweig and Schultz 1981). Another possibility is that poor health re-
sults in little education (Perri 1984, Curry and Hyson 1999). Finally, this correlation could be
caused by a third unobserved variable that aﬀects both education and health, for example genetic
characteristics or parental background. Many studies have attempted to include these factors.5
However, Fuchs (1982) argued that discount rates (which no study controls for) would also explain
the correlation: people who are impatient invest little in education and health, while people who
are patient invest a lot in both.6 Of course, these theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
In this paper I address this issue using a unique quasi-natural experiment: between 1915 and
1939, at least 30 states changed their compulsory schooling laws and child labor laws. If compulsory
schooling laws forced people to get more schooling than they would have chosen otherwise, and
if education increases health, then individuals who spent their teens in states that required them
to go to school for more years should be relatively healthier and live longer. The intuition that
compulsory education laws provide a natural experiment was put forward ﬁrst by Angrist and
Krueger (1991). They argued that because compulsory education laws forced individuals to stay
in school until a certain age, those born in later quarters would stay in school longer. Although
they were criticized for their choice of quarter of birth as an instrument,7 the underlying principle
is appealing and implementable. 8
No other papers have used natural experiments to measure the eﬀect of education on mortality.
A few studies (Berger and Leigh 1988, Sander 1995, and Leigh and Dhir 1997) have used instru-
mental variable (IV) estimation with other measures of health, such as blood pressure, smoking
5 Wolfe and Behrman (1987), Duleep (1986) and Menchik (1993) ﬁnd no education eﬀect once controls are
added.
6 Fuchs (1982) and Farrel and Fuchs (1982) examined this issue but their evidence is inconclusive. Munasinghe
and Sicherman (2000) do ﬁnd that time preference plays an important role in the determination of smoking.
7 See Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) and Bound and Jaeger (1996).
8 Harmon and Walker (1995) look at the eﬀects of the laws in the UK. Meghir and Palme (1999) used Swedish
data. Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) used US laws to determine the size of the social returns to education.
2or exercise.9 But these studies are inconclusive because each paper’s choice of instrument is
questionable. For example, all of these studies use parents’ background/education as instruments,
but we know these are correlated with children’s health,10 and furthermore, we know that health
shocks during childhood or gestation have persistent health eﬀects into adulthood.11 Income and
education expenditures in state-of-birth could serve as instruments (Berger and Leigh 1988), but
again they might be correlated with state expenditures on health, state industrial composition
and other state characteristics that aﬀect health.
Using the 1960, 1970 and 1980 Censuses of the US, I select those individuals who were 14 years
of age between 1915 and 1939. I then construct synthetic cohorts and follow them over time to
calculate their mortality rates. I then match cohorts to the compulsory attendance and child labor
laws that were in place in their state-of-birth when they were 14 years old. The census data have
not been used to calculate mortality rates before in economic analyses.12 This method could be
used to analyze mortality experiences in periods where no other data are available.
Several IV estimations are presented, including an original two-stage procedure for grouped
d a t at h a tc a nb ea p p l i e dw h e nt h eﬁrst stage can be estimated at the individual level but the second
stage can only be estimated at the aggregate level. This procedure, inspired by the traditional
two-stage least squares (2SLS) method, can easily be applied to other cases as well.
The results provide evidence that suggests there is a causal eﬀe c to fe d u c a t i o no nm o r t a l i t y
and that this eﬀect is perhaps larger than the previous literature suggests. While GLS estimates
9 Berger and Leigh (1988) estimate the eﬀect of education on blood pressure using the NHANES I. They use
state-of-birth, income and education expenditures per capita from year-of-birth to age 6 in state-of-birth, and
dummies for ancestry as instruments for education. They also estimate the eﬀect of education on disability with
NLS data, using IQ and family background measures as instruments. In both cases schooling is signiﬁcant. Using
a sample of older persons from the 1986 PSID, Leigh and Dhir (1997) use parental education, background, and
state-of-residence at age 16 to instrument for education in regressions for disability and exercise. Alternatively,
they include direct measures of time preferences and risk aversion. Education was not always signiﬁcant. Finally
Sander (1995) examines the eﬀect of schooling on the odds of quitting smoking using the General Social Survey.
He uses parental schooling as an instrument for schooling and ﬁnds that the eﬀect of schooling is quite large for
whites.
10 Development studies show that family background aﬀects children’s health (see Strauss and Thomas, 1995).
11 For examples see studies that looked at the consequences of the Dutch famine on the health of adults conceived
during the famine, such as Hoek, Brown and Susser (1998) or Roseboom (2000).
12 However this methodology is used in epidemiology. For example see the work by Haines and Preston (1996).
3suggest that an additional year of education lowers the probability of dying in the next 10 years
by approximately 1.3 percentage points, my results from the IV estimation show that the eﬀect is
much larger: at least 3.6 percentage points. However the results also suggest that the OLS and
the IV estimates are not statistically diﬀerent.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in this project, including
a description of how the census is used to obtain mortality rates. Section 3 shows that compulsory
attendance and child labor laws had an impact on the educational attainment of individuals, and
presents evidence that these laws are good instruments. Section 4 presents the general econometric
framework used for analyzing mortality. The results are presented and discussed in Section 5, and
conclusions are given in section 6.
2D a t a
I use the U.S. censuses of 1960, 1970 and 1980, which are one percent random samples of the
population.13 The census provides information on age, sex, race, education, marital status,
urban location, state of residence and state of birth. My samples include all white persons born
in the 48 states,14 that were 14 years of age between 1914 and 1939, with no missing values for
completed years of education.15
I use the censuses to follow “synthetic cohorts.” Although I do not observe the same individuals
over time (so I cannot observe individual deaths), I do observe the same groups over time, which
allows me to estimate group death rates. I aggregate the censuses into groups deﬁned according
to their gender/cohort and state-of-birth (descriptive statistics in Table 1). Using the 1960, 1970
and 1980 censuses, I can calculate two 10-year death rates for each group: one for 1960-1970, and
another for 1970-1980. For example, the 1960-1970 death rate for a group is the number of people
13 The data come from the IPUMS 1960 general sample, the 1970 Form 2 State sample (originally 15% state
sample), and the 1980 1% Metro sample (originally B sample).
14 Hawaii and Alaska were not then part of the Union.
15 For consistency across censuses, I recoded completed years of education to be a maximum of 18 years instead
of 20 in 1980.
4alive in 1960 (N60) minus the number of people alive in 1970 (N70) divided by the population in
1960 (N60).
One issue that arises in estimating death rates by groups is measurement error. As Figure 3
shows, because of random sampling the number of deaths will be overestimated about half the
time and underestimated half the time for all cohorts. As a result, some estimated death rates are
negative. In the data, we observe more negative death rates for younger cohorts and fewer negative
d e a t hr a t e sf o ro l d e rc o h o r t s( s e eF i g u r e4 A ) ;t h i si sap a t t e r nw es h o u l de x p e c t .A sw ec a ns e ei n
Figure 3B, with a zero death rate (no change in the population), two successive samplings of the
same population result in a negative death rates half the time. When the death rate increases (as
the population ages), the likelihood that the second sample will contain more observations than
the ﬁrst falls, resulting in fewer negative death rates.We also observe fewer negative death rates
for states with large population (Figure 4B), which is also to be expected since the sampling error
is smaller for larger populations.
The negative death rates are not a source of concern for two reasons. First, the estimated death
rates will result in consistent estimates of the true death rates.16 Second, average cohort death
rates from the censuses are very similar to those obtained from individual data from the NHEFS
described below (see Figure 4C). Note that the graph suggests there is evidence of age heaping:
for ages that are multiples of 10, the death rates fall, because individuals tend to over-report their
age and chose a multiple of ten when doing so.
I also used the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey I Epidemiologic Follow-up
Study, 1992 (hereafter NHEFS). This survey followed 14,407 individuals who were between 25 and
74 years of age when interviewed for the ﬁrst National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
(NHANES I) between 1971 and 1974. The NHEFS followed individuals and recorded whether
they had died by 1985. The sample is composed of whites17 that were 14 years of age between
16 Also note that IV estimates are only consistent, not unbiased, estimates of structural parameters. A consistent
estimate of the dependent variable is suﬃcient for the IV estimators to be consistent.
17 Other researchers have suggested that blacks had signiﬁcantly diﬀerent school experiences during the begining
51914 and 1939, who were alive in 1975 and followed successfully, with no missing observations for
years of completed education (N=4554). Table 1 shows the summary statistics for this data.
The data on compulsory attendance and child labor laws come from a number of sources.
There are eight years of state-level data (1915, 1918, 1921, 1924, 1929, 1930, 1935 and 1939) on
these laws,18 and some additional information for other years. I imputed missing observations
by using the older values. I also collected data on state-level factors that contributed to the
growth of secondary education from 1915 to 193919 or that could aﬀect mortality. These include
state expenditures on education, number of school buildings per acre, percent of the population
that was living in urban areas, percent of the white population that was foreign born, percent
of the population that was black, percent of the population employed in manufacturing, average
annual wages in manufacturing per worker, average value of farm property per acre, and number
of doctors per capita (See Lleras-Muney 2001 for information on data sources).
Each individual is matched to the laws and state characteristics that were in place in their
state-of-birth when they were 14 years old. I choose this age because it is the lowest common
drop-out age across states. This procedure assumes that individuals went to school in their state-
of-birth. Inevitably some individuals were mismatched. However, Card and Krueger (1992) show
that mobility was low during this period. Also Lleras-Muney (2001) shows that mobility seems to
be uncorrelated to these laws and that restricting the sample to those that are still living in their
state-of-birth does not change the eﬀect of the laws.20
of the century. See Card and Krueger (1992). Also, Lleras-Muney (2001) suggests that compulsory schooling laws
and child labor laws did not aﬀect blacks.
18 Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) have gathered similar data. The data for this project was collected independently.
19 The state-level variables were suggested by the work of Goldin (1994) and Goldin and Katz (1997).
20 I regressed mobility between state-of-birth and state-of-residence in1960 as a function of education, compulsory
education laws and all other covariates used in this paper. The F statistic of joint signiﬁcance of the laws has a
value of 1.17 (p value of 0.3151), suggesting the laws cannot explain mobility. Also Lleras-Muney (2001) shows
that restricting the sample to those that are still living in their state-of-birth yields estimates of the eﬀect of the
laws that are statistically identical to those presented here.
63 Did Compulsory Attendance and Child Labor Laws aﬀect
schooling? First Stage
The validity of the methodology proposed in this paper rests on the crucial assumption that com-
pulsory attendance laws and child labor laws can be used as instruments. This section estimates
the ﬁrst stage, showing that the laws are good predictors of educational attainment both at the
individual and aggregate level. I also provide additional evidence here that the laws are good
instruments. These results will then be used in the two-stage (IV) estimations in Sections 4 and
5.
3.1 Compulsory Attendance and Child Labor Laws
Since their inception in Massachusetts in 1852, compulsory attendance laws have been complex.
They specify a minimum and a maximum age between which school attendance is required; a
minimum period of attendance; penalties for non-compliance; and the conditions under which
individuals could be exempted from attending school, such as the completion of a given grade,
mental or physical disability, distance from school, and so on. The most common exemption
was for work. Work permits were available even for young children, generally even younger
than the minimum dropout age speciﬁed by compulsory education laws. Child labor laws, which
extensively regulated the employment of minors, also included several conditions for the granting
of such permits and for exemptions.
Child labor laws and compulsory attendance laws often were not coordinated. Each stipulated
diﬀerent requirements for leaving school. For example, in 1924 in Pennsylvania, the ages for com-
pulsory attendance were 8 to 16, but the child labor laws allowed 14 year-olds to get work permits
and leave school.21 Continuation school laws, which forced children at work to continue their
education on a part-time basis, were the only laws that attempted to bridge this gap. Compul-
sory attendance laws and child labor laws were in place in all states by 1918, and were modiﬁed
21 During this early period work permits eﬀectively allowed children to leave school. See Woltz (1955).
7frequently thereafter.
There is little agreement regarding the eﬀectiveness of these laws.22 Previous studies (in-
cluding my own)23 suggest that only three of the many aspects of these laws had an impact
on individual educational attainment: the age at which a child had to enter school (enter age),
the age at which the child could get a work permit and leave school (work age), and whether or
not the state required children with work permits to attend school on a part-time basis (con-
tsch). Following Acemoglu and Angrist (1999), I combine the age at which a child had to
enter school and the age required for work permit into a single variable, childcom,d e ﬁned as:
childcom = work age− enter age. This variable is the implicit number of years that a child had
to attend school, given that the entering age and the work permit age were enforced. It takes the
values of 0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10. The other variable, contsch, takes the value of 1 if continuation
school laws were in place. Tabulations describing these laws throughout the period for each state
are shown in the Appendix. Importantly note that it is not always the case that more years of
compulsory schooling were required, although on average states required more schooling towrds
t h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d .
The period from 1915-1939 is when compulsory education laws (hereafter I refer to both com-
pulsory attendance laws and child labor laws as “compulsory education laws”) are more likely to
have aﬀected many individuals. Secondary schooling was experiencing remarkable growth, espe-
cially in the ﬁrst 40 years of this century.24 Also, in the previous period (up to 1915), these laws
were perceived as ineﬀective.25 But social scientists agree that the laws were enforced by the
1920s26 and Schmidt’s work (1995)–the only study to concentrate on this period–conﬁrms it.
22 For a detailed review of these studies see Lleras-Muney (2001).
23 See Lleras-Muney (2002), Angrist and Acemoglu (1999) and Schmidt (1996).
24 Goldin and Katz (1997) show that the percentage of young adults with high school degrees increased from 9
p e r c e n ti n1 9 1 0t om o r et h a n5 0p e r c e n ti n1 9 4 0 .
25 Many state laws did not even provide enforcement mechanisms, and if they did, there were often insuﬃcient
means to enforce them, especially in rural areas. See Katz (1976) and Ensign (1921)
26 See Katz(1976).
8Edwards (1978), and Angrist and Krueger (1991) suggest that the laws declined in importance
after the 1940s. So the ﬁrst part of the 20th century provides the perfect window of opportunity
for using the laws as instruments. Finally, from a technical point of view, this period is interesting
because states were constantly changing their compulsory education and child labor laws.
3.2 The eﬀect of the laws on educational attainment
As preliminary evidence of the eﬀect of these laws on education, I graph the average education by
childcom for the entire sample (Figure 5) and by cohort, for every 5th cohort in the data (Figure
6). Both graphs show that average education is higher for those in states where more education
was compulsory. In order to add further controls, I turn to regression analysis. Pooling individual
data from the 1960 and 1970 census, I estimate the following model:
Eics = b + CLcsπ + Xicsβ + Wcsδ + γc + αs + εics.
The dependent variable is years of completed education for individual i of cohort c born in state s.
CL is a set of dummies for compulsory education laws in place in state s when the individual was
14, Xics are individual characteristics such as gender and region of current residence, Wcs is a set of
characteristics of individual i’s state-of-birth at age 14 (such as manufacturing wages, expenditures
in education, per capita doctors, etc.), γc are cohort dummies, αs are state-of-birth dummies. The
regression also includes interactions between region-of-birth and cohort, an intercept (b)a n da
dummy for 1970. I also estimate the model by aggregating the data at the state-of-birth/cohort
and gender level. Both estimations will be used in Section 4 (ﬁrst stage).
Table 2 shows the results. The ﬁrst column estimates the relationship including only state
eﬀects, cohort eﬀects, a female dummy, and a set of dummies for the laws. The coeﬃcients are
fairly robust to the addition of other controls (see column 2).27 The last column shows the results
from estimating the equation using the data aggregated at the state-of-birth, cohort and gender
27 Inclusion of other variables, such as income, immigrant status of parents, has no impact on them. Also,
regressions by region-of-birth or by gender yield similar results. See Lleras-Muney (2001) for these results.
9level. The estimations show that the laws increased the educational attainment of individuals. As
expected, all dummies for the laws are positive and signiﬁcant and they generally increase as the
number of compulsory years increases. Overall, the implied increase in educational attainment
due to childcom is around 4.8 percent.28 This estimate is similar to those reported by Acemoglu
and Angrist (2000), Eisenberg (1988) and Angrist and Krueger (1991). Also, the continuation
school dummy is positive.29
Before turning to the eﬀect of education on mortality, I present evidence that the laws are
good instruments. At the bottom the Table 2, I report the F-test of joint signiﬁcance of the
laws; it shows that the laws are always jointly signiﬁcant at the 5% level for both speciﬁcations.
Additionally the F-statistic is greater than (or very close to) 5, which suggests that the instruments
are strong. I also report the partial R-squared coeﬃcient, another measure of the instruments’
strength.30 It has a value of 0.0001 or higher, which compares favorably to those reported by
Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995).
It is also worth pointing out that the changes in the laws that took place during this period
appear to have been exogenous to individuals. Although diﬀerent states might have had diﬀerent
tastes for education, the regressions here include a very large set of controls (cohort dummies, state-
of-birth dummies and region-of-birth*cohort interactions are included) which should capture this
eﬀect. Also note that the addition of controls (compare column 1 and 2 of Table 2) has little eﬀect
on the coeﬃcients of the laws, suggesting that any excluded state-of-birth/cohort level variables are
not correlated with the laws. Furthermore, Lleras-Muney (2001) presents evidence consistent with
exogenous laws: her results suggest that the laws impacted only the lower end of the distribution
of education. She rejects the hypothesis that changes in the laws during this period resulted from
28 This was calculated by replacing the set of dummies by the continuous variable. See Lleras-Muney (2001).
29 Continuation school is not signiﬁcant in this sample, but previous work (see Lleras-Muney, 2001) showed that
this law aﬀected white males and individuals born in the north and south of the U.S. Therefore I include it.
30 Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) suggest that: 1-the F statistic on the excluded instruments in the ﬁrst stage
should be statistically signiﬁcant and large (Staiger and Stock (1997) further suggests that a value of less than 5
could signal weak instruments. This is a rule of thumb); 2-the partial r-square should be high.
10(rather than caused) increases in education.31
A ﬁnal concern is that the laws must aﬀect individual health only through their eﬀect on
education. There is no evidence that the laws included any clauses or restrictions that would have
aﬀected health independently. For example, there were no lunch programs provided as part of
school attendance. Also the states that led in education during this period (the prairie states32
) were not the same states that led in health (northeastern states).33 But again, the controls
included here are meant to rule out this possibility. Finally, exogeneity tests are performed in the
IV estimation (see next section).
Overall the results show that the laws did have an impact on educational achievement, and
that their predictive power is large, so they can be used as instruments. Therefore I turn now to
the question of the eﬀect of education on mortality.
4 Health and Education: Econometric model
4.1 Least Squares Estimation
The econometric model for the relationship between education and health can be written as a
linear system of simultaneous equations:
Hi = X1iβ1 + Eiπ1 + ε1i (1)
Ei = X2iβ2 + Hiπ2 + ε2i, (2)
where H i is individual i’s health stock, E is his education level, X 1 is a vector of individual
characteristics that aﬀect health, such as smoking, and genetic factors. X 2 is a vector of individual
characteristics that determine education, such as ability. X 1 and X 2 may contain common factors.
31 The test, inspired by Landes and Solomon (1972), consists of matching individuals to the laws in place in their
state-of-birth when they were 17, 18 and up to 26 years of age, when these laws should no longer have aﬀected
them.
32 See Goldin and Katz (1997).
33 Starr’s 1982 book provides anecdotal evidence that the northern states lead in a variety of health aspects.
My own data supports this conclusion. For example, the north had the highest number of doctors per capita
throughout the period. And the number of doctors per capita in the north did not decline from 1915 to 1939 but
did decline in the rest of the country. The north also had the highest declines in infant mortality rates during this
period. (Results available upon request.)
11This general speciﬁcation allows for causality to run from education to health and vice-versa.
The purpose of this paper is to determine only whether or not education aﬀects health (i.e.
π1 =0 ? ) . Therefore I only estimate the health equation. Although health is unobserved, mortality
is observable. Following Grossman’s model of health (reviewed in his 1999 paper), death occurs
when the stock of health falls bellow a certain threshold. In a less deterministic model, H i is
proportional to the underlying probability (index) of being alive, and death is the observed result.
This is the usual limited-dependent variable set-up.
This mortality equation can be estimated at the individual level using the NHEFS but not the
census. If individuals could be followed from the 1960 census to the 1970 census (or from 1970 to
1980), then (based on the previous discussion) the following individual linear probability model
could be estimated:
Dt,ics = b + Eicsπ +( Xt−1)icsβ + Wcsδ + γc + αs + εics, (3)
where Dti is equal to one if the individual is deceased at time t. Eics is i’s education (measured
by completed years of education), Xt−1 are other individual characteristics measured as of (t-1)
(including gender),W cs is a set of characteristics of individual i’s state-of-birth at age 14, γc is a
set of cohort dummies, αs is a set of state-of-birth dummies, b is an intercept, and ε is the error
term.
Using the census, individuals cannot be tracked over time, but I can track groups that are
constant over time, and calculate their death rates by aggregating the data. I aggregate by
gender, cohort, and state-of-birth. This aggregation level uses all of the available individual
characteristics that are time invariant (except for education), and therefore it maximizes the
number of observations in the aggregate data. The aggregate model is derived from the individual
model by averaging over individuals in a given gender/cohort/state-of-birth group as follows:
Dtgcs = b + Egcsπ + (Xt−1)gcsβ + Wcsδ + γc + αs + εgcs, (4)
where Dtgcs represents the proportion of individuals that died in a given group or the death
12rate for that group, and Xt−1gcs represents the average characteristics of that group at (t-1)( f o r
example, the the percentage of people in that group living in urban areas).34
Note that I use a linear probability model for the estimation. The existence of negative death
rates makes it impossible to use a non-linear model such as a Logit or Normit. However, since the
dependent variable (the death rate) is not censored below by 0, the linear probability assumption is
less problematic in this case than in general. In this linear model the error term is heteroskedastic
however. A standard estimation procedure35 in this case is to run weighted least squares, where
the weights are constructed using the observed probablities. Again, due to random sampling
and the error it generates, these observed probabilities can be negative, so this estimation is not
possible. In order to address the heteroskedasticity problem I estimate the equation by GLS
(weighted least squares) using the number of individuals in the group as weights. To correct for
further heteroskedasticity, I use White’s estimator.
4.2 Eﬃcient Wald estimates
One obvious solution to correct for the bias in the GLS coeﬃcient is to use Instrumental Variables
(IV). Given that many instruments are available, Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) would be the
preferred estimation method. At the individual level, the 2SLS model is:
Dti = b + Eicsπ +( Xt−1)icsβ + Wcsδ + γc + αs + εi
Eics = b + CLcsπ +( Xt−1)icsβ + Wcsδ + γc + αs + εics,
where D is equal to one if the individual is deceased at time t. E is i’s education (measured
by completed years of education), Xt−1 are other individual characteristics measured as of (t-1)
(including gender),W cs is a set of characteristics of individual i’s state-of-birth at age 14, γc is a
set of cohort dummies, αs is a set of state-of-birth dummies, b is an intercept, and ε is the error
term, which is assumed to be normal N(0,σ2
1I). CL is the set of compulsory education laws that
34 Including a dummy for gender.
35 See Maddala p. 29, Green p. 895.
13serve as instruments to identify the education equation. This model can be estimated using the
individual NHEFS data but not with the census.
Since the census data can be used only as grouped data, the Wald estimator is an alternative
estimator for the eﬀect of education. Angrist (1991) showed that the Wald estimator for grouped
data is eﬃcient and in fact equivalent to 2SLS using individual level data. In the case of many
explanatory variables the eﬃcient Wald estimator is found by GLS estimation of the following
equation:
Dcrl = Ecrlπ + γc + δr + εcrl, (5)
where Dcrl is the death rate for individuals born in cohort c in region r under compulsory law l,
and Ecsl is the average education of individuals born in cohort c in region r under compulsory
law l. The weights are given by the population in each group. In other words, Wald is estimated
by grouping the data by gender/cohort/region-of-birth and compulsory education law. This pro-
cedure is equivalent to 2SLS at the individual level, where gender, cohort dummies and region
dummies serve as their own instruments (since they are exogenous), and compulsory education
laws serve as instruments for education, the endogenous variable. The estimates are referred to
as the eﬃcient Wald estimates.
Note that because compulsory education laws are deﬁned at the state-of-birth and cohort level,
I cannot control for both state-of-birth and cohort when using this estimator. This is a drawback
of the Wald estimator, especially if one thinks that state-of-birth and the laws are correlated.
In order to alleviate this problem, I control instead for region-of-birth. But region-of-birth may
not be a good proxy for state-of-birth. Furthermore, other individual (Xt−1) and state-of-birth
characteristics (Wcs) cannot be included in this speciﬁcation.
4.3 Two-Stage Least Squares with Aggregate Data
Alternatively, I can estimate the 2SLS model at the data that has been aggregated at the state-of-
birth/cohort and gender level. Estimation at the aggregate level results in less eﬃcient estimates
14(see Green pp. 433-434) but all the covariates (especially state-of-birth) can be included. Using
the aggregate data 2SLS is obtained by estimating the following model:
Dgcs = b + Egcsπ + Xt−1gcsβ + Wcsδ + γc + αs + εgcs
Egcs = b1 + CLcsπ + Xt−1gcsβ + Wcsδ + γc + αs + εgcs
where now Dtgcs is the proportion of individuals who died in a given gender/cohort and state-of-
birth, Egcs is the average education of that group and (Xt−1)gcs are other average characteristics.
Again, the weights are given by the number of observations in each cell, and the excluded instru-
ments from the mortality equation are the compulsory education dummies, CLcs.T h eﬁrst stage
(estimation of Egcs) w a ss h o w ni nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n .
4.4 Mixed Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation
The census allows me to estimate the ﬁrst stage using individual data. The intuition behind
Mixed-2SLS is that it might be possible to take advantage of this fact and gain eﬃciency (relative
to the previous 2SLS) by estimating the ﬁrst stage at the individual level (as done in the previous
section) and then aggregating the data by gender/cohort/state-of-birth. (See Dhrymes and Lleras-
Muney, 2001.)36 Mixed 2SLS is obtained by estimating the following equation through weighted
least squares:
Dgcs = b + b Egcsπ + Xt−1gcsβ + Wcsδ + γc + αs + εgcs
Again Dgcs represents the proportion of individuals who died in a given gender/cohort and
state-of-birth group, Xgcs represents the average characteristics of the group, but now I include
b Egcs, the average predicted education for that group from the ﬁrst stage.37 The weights are
given by the number of observations in each cell. The excluded instruments from the mortality
equation are the compulsory education dummies. The only diﬀerence between standard 2SLS with
36 Dhrymes and Lleras-Muney (2001) compare 2SLS and Mixed 2SLS estimators. The question of which estimator
has lower variance turns out to be data dependent, but it is possible for Mixed 2SLS to be more eﬃcient.
37 The expression for the ﬁrst stage was given in the previous section.
15aggregated data and Mixed-2SLS is in the predicted education term. 2SLS uses predicted average
education whereas Mixed-2SLS uses average predicted education.
More formally, let H be the matrix that transforms the data into group means and weights
each group mean by the number of individuals in the group. b X contains all the same variables as
in the GLS estimation, but with education replaced by the predicted level of education from the
ﬁrst stage regression ( b X =
h
b E | Xt−1 | γc | αs
i
. Then the estimator βMixed can be expressed as:
βMixed =
³
b X0H0H b X
´−1
b X0H0HD
This procedure also results in consistent estimates. As usual the variance-covariance matrix
needs to be corrected.38
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Least Squares Results
Although we have good reason to believe that GLS produces biased estimates, I report them here
as the benchmark for comparison with the IV results. Using the census, I estimate the GLS model
described above. The results are in the ﬁrst column of Table 3. The estimated coeﬃcient of the
eﬀect of education on the death rate is about -0.012. The coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant and is is
robust to the inclusion of more controls.39
The validity of the aggregation procedure rests on the assumption that the aggregate data can
be understood as coming from unobserved individual data. It is important that this intuition be
conﬁrmed, so I compare aggregate results from the census with those obtained with the NHEFS
individual data. Using individual NHEFS data, I estimate a linear probability model and a probit
model, where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether or not the person died
between 1975 and 1985. Then I aggregate the NHEFS data by gender, state-of-birth, and cohort
and again estimate the same linear model estimated with the census data. Because of the small
38 The standard errors were bootstrapped using 2000 replications.
39 Results available upon request.
16number of observations in the NHEFS aggregating by gender, state-of-birth and cohort results in
very few observations per cell, so I also reproduce the results only aggregating by state-of-birth
and cohort. The results are shown in Table 3.
Comparing the results from LS regressions from the census with results from the NHEFS shows
that the census data gives extremely accurate estimates of the eﬀect of education. The census
LS estimates are very similar to those obtained using the NHEFS aggregated data, which in turn
are similar to those obtained at the individual level, using either LS or probit estimations. These
results suggest that sampling (and the measurement error it generates) does not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the estimates for education, that there is no aggregation bias and that the linear model is
a good approximation of the education-death rate relationship. The comparison is also useful in
terms of interpretation: a -0.012 coeﬃcient for education means that increasing the education of a
given cell by one year lowers its death rate by 1.2 percentage points. This coeﬃcient also implies
that increasing an individual’s education by one year will lower his probability of dying between
1960 and 1970 (or between 1970 and 1980) by 1.2 percentage points. This latter interpretation is
more intuitive and useful. Note again that the OLS eﬀect is quite large: at the mean, this result
implies that a 10 percent increase in education lowers mortality by about 11 percent, therefore an
elasticity of about -1.
5.2 IV results
The ﬁrst column in Table 4 presents the 2SLS resultsu s i n gt h eN H E F S .T h i se s t i m a t i o ni sd o n e
at the individual level and using standard 2SLS. The estimate is positive (the eﬀect of education
is about -0.02) but not signiﬁcant: because this sample is small, the ﬁrst stage estimation40 is
poor. Nonetheless, although the standard errors are high, the estimates from this sample are also
larger than the GLS estimates obtained from the same data.
The second column shows the results from the Wald estimation. The Wald estimate of the eﬀect
40 Results available upon request. Only two of the dummies for compulsory education laws were signiﬁcant at
the 10% level, and the set of dummies was jointly insigniﬁcant.
17of education is about -0.037 and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The third column presents the
results of 2SLS estimation using aggregated data at the gender/state-of-birth-and cohort level. The
eﬀect of education is about -0.045 and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. The Mixed 2SLS results
(last column) show that the coeﬃcient on education is approximately -0.059 and is signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level. All of the previous estimates are signiﬁcant at the 5% level using a one-tailed
test (that the eﬀect is negative) which is perhaps more appropriate in this set-up.41 Overall the
results suggest that increasing education by one additional year lowers the 10-year death rate by
at least 3.6 percentage points.42
For the last two estimators I perform a test of overidentifying restrictions. The χ2 statistic
for the aggregate 2SLS model is 2.42 and 1.49 for the Mixed 2SLS model. This statistic tests
the hypothesis that the model is well speciﬁed. It is calculated as the sample size times the R2
from a regression of the residuals from the second stage on all exogenous variables, including the
instruments. In both cases the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at a 5 percent level
(critical value 14.06). This test in conjunction with earlier results from the ﬁrst stage suggests
that compulsory education laws are legitimate instruments.
Additional checks are presented in Table 5. As a last attempt to address the potential endo-
geneity of the laws, I repeat the estimations above using a larger set of instruments that include
quarter of birth, compulsory attendance and child labor laws, and the interactions of quarter
of birth and the laws. Presumably these individual-level instruments will increase the eﬃciency
of the estimates, and they are perhaps less likely to be endogenous.43 The results (Panel A)
are identical to those presented above. The results are also very similar if only the interactions
between the laws and quarter of birth are used as instruments, and quarter of birth as well as
41 I thank Michael Grossman for this insight.
42 Estimates by region are comparable in size to those presented here except that they are generally not signiﬁcant.
43 Note however that the use of these instruments might be questionable (see papers in footnote 10). Also
Lleras-Muney (2001) shows for example that the laws aﬀected whites but not blacks. However quarter of birth
does appear to aﬀect blacks’ educational attainment. This again raises the issue of whether quarter of birth has an
independent eﬀect on education unrelated to compulsory attendance laws.
18compulsory schooling laws are included as controls in both the ﬁrst and second stage.44 This
again suggests that the instruments are not endogenous.
Panel B presents the reduced form estimates, i.e. the direct eﬀect of the laws on mortality. The
results are consistent with previous estimations: if the eﬀect of childcom on education is about 5
percent, and the eﬀect of education on mortality is about 6 percent, then the direct eﬀect of the
laws on mortality should be about 0.3 percent, which is approximately what the reduced form
result shows.
Panel C shows the results excluding ages 40, 50 and 60 since the data showed evidence of age
heaping. This is a potential problem if age heaping is correlated with education. The IV results
are very similar to the previous results. Finally in Panel D I repeat the estimations by region
of birth. They are quantitatively identical to all the results presented before. So the previous
estimates are not purely based on diﬀerences between regions.
Since, it is well known that there exist persistent diﬀerences in mortality rates by gender I
reproduce results by gender in Table 6. The coeﬃcient on education is somewhat smaller for
females than for males, conﬁrming the ﬁndings in the literature that the eﬀect of education is
larger for males. These results also suggest that World Wars I and II did not results in signiﬁcant
selection bias for men. Also, in these estimations the eﬀect of marriage is negative as the literature
suggest, whereas the eﬀect is positive in the joint estimations. This is a composition eﬀect: males
are both more likely die and to be married.
5.3 Discussion
This section has presented four diﬀerent estimates of the eﬀect of education on mortality. Three
diﬀerent estimators, using two diﬀerent data sets and three diﬀerent levels of aggregation, were
used. Although each estimate has weaknesses, all estimates point to the same conclusion: the
eﬀect of education is causal and in fact larger than OLS suggests. Given this variety of estimates,
44 Results available upon request.
19this result is very robust. The result is surprising for two reasons. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h eI Ve s t i m a t e s
are larger than the LS estimates. The second is that the eﬀect of education is quite large. In this
section I discuss these two issues.
5.3.1 Larger IV estimates
In all the IV estimations presented here, the eﬀect of education is much larger than the LS
estimates suggest. The Mixed 2SLS estimates suggest the eﬀect is as large as -0.058, whereas
Wald estimates imply a coeﬃcient of about -0.036. At ﬁrst, this could seem to be a surprising
result: the a priori expectation was that LS estimates would be too large. However there are two
important points to notice.
First note that the standard errors in the IV estimates are large. Even though the IV estimates
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, it is unclear whether they are statistically diﬀerent from the OLS
estimates. To test whether the IV and OLS estimates are diﬀerent, one can perform a Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test. The F-statistic for this test is 1.51 (p-value 0.22). Therefore I cannot reject
the null hypothesis that OLS and IV are the same.
Note that an implication of this test is that education is in fact exogenous, since it suggests
that the IV estimates are no diﬀerent from the OLS estimates in a statistical sense. From this
test, I conclude that education appears to have a large causal eﬀect on mortality. Furthermore, I
conclude that the larger IV estimates are not of particular concern.
However, if one still thought that education was endogenous, then the most plausible expla-
nation for the diﬀerence between the IV and the OLS estimates in this case is related to the
choice of instrument.45 Under the assumption that diﬀerent individuals face diﬀerent returns to
education due to unobserved characteristics, IV estimates reﬂect the marginal rate of return of the
45 Another explanation is that the omitted variable bias is smaller than the bias that results from measurement
error in education (Card 1995) The health literature has not been concerned with this potential problem although
there is evidence of measurement error in education . If the measurement error is random, then IV estimate will
be larger than the OLS estimate. Larger IV returns can also be explained if there exist health externalities from
education for example if average education aﬀects individual health. However note that the fact that individual
and agregate estimations using the NHEFS result in similar eﬀects for education suggests that externalities are not
t h em a i nr e a s o nf o rl a r g e rI V .
20group aﬀected by the instrument (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996), in this case IV capture the
returns to those aﬀected by the compulsory schooling laws. If I estimate a regression of mortality
as a function of education and education squared, where both are instrumented with compulsory
schooling laws, I do indeed ﬁnd some evidence that the relationship is convex. However I do
not place too much weight on these results given that a) under the hypothesis that education is
endogenous, the instruments can only identify a non-linear relation for those aﬀected by the laws,
rather than for the population at large, and b) education does not appear to be endogenous!
5.3.2 What is the eﬀect of education on health?
The second issue is that the eﬀect of education is quite large, and it is important to understand
why. I categorize the potential eﬀects of education into two categories: direct and indirect eﬀects.
Among the direct eﬀect, education provides individuals with critical thinking skills that are
useful in the production of health (Grossman’s hypothesis). There is some evidence to this eﬀect.
For example, Goldman and Smith (2001) ﬁnd that the more educated are more likely to comply
with treatments for diabetes and Aids. Goldman and Lakdawalla (2001) suggest that the more
educated are better able to manage chronic conditions. These two papers suggest that education
matters when treatments are complex and there is scope for learning by doing. These mechanisms
have also been documented by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1989), who compared success rates of
diﬀerent contraception methods for women with diﬀerent levels of education: they ﬁnd that success
rates are identical for all women for “easy” methods such as the pill, but the rhythm method is
only eﬀective for educated women.
If this is the case, then the interaction of education with a variety of factors might be rele-
vant. For example, although access to information alone cannot explain health diﬀerences across
education groups (Kenkel, 1991), information available to the more educated will result in greater
beneﬁts for them if they can use the information better. For example when analyzing the eﬀects
of the 1964 Surgeon General Report, Meara (2001) concluded that “the response to knowledge
21plays a more important role than knowledge itself in creating diﬀerential health behavior”.
Another possibility is that the more educated might be more likely to adopt and use new
medical technologies.46 Since the rate of medical innovation dramatically increased in the last
century, especially for particular diseases such as heart disease (Cutler et al. 1998), it is reasonable
to think that the more educated were able to capture very high returns during this period. Lleras-
Muney and Lichtenberg (2001) for example show that the more educated are more likely to use
newer drugs.
There are a few indirect mechanisms through which education might aﬀect health which are
also consistent with the results in this paper. One obvious one is that being in the classroom is
less of a health risk than working, especially while growing up. I cannot with my data distinguish
the eﬀect from not working from that of being in school.
Also note that education gives you access to a higher income and diﬀerent types of jobs, both
of which aﬀect health. For example, only high school graduates in the ﬁrst half of the century
had access to white collar jobs, which provided healthier work environments than manufacturing
or agriculture. Controlling for income (or occupation) does not change the results in this paper
(results are presented in Table 7). But, since income is endogenous, it is not possible (given that
I have no instruments for income) to distinguish the direct eﬀect of education on health from
its indirect eﬀect through income. The same is true for occupation. However, Grossman (1975)
showed that the eﬀects of income on health disappear once a certain level of income has been
reached, while the same is not true for education. Furthermore, standard results suggest that the
returns to education are about 10% and that the elasticity of mortality with respect to income is
about -0.3.47 I ft h es o l ee ﬀect of education is through income, one more year of education should
46 See Nelson and Phelps (1966)
47 Deaton and Paxson (1999).
22decrease mortality by 0.003 (for average mortality of 0.11),48 which is a much smaller eﬀect than
what was estimated here. With respect to occupation, I simply note here that since the eﬀect of
education is similar for men and women, it would appear that occupation is not the only channel
through which education aﬀects health.
Finally note that the cognitive psychology literature has documented that lack of education is
correlated with stress, depression and hostility, all of which have been shown to adversely aﬀect
health (Adler et al, 1994).
A ﬁnal comment is that the results in this paper do not imply that time preferences do not
aﬀect health and education choices nor that there is no reverse causality from health to education.
They simply show that there is a causal eﬀect of education on health, and that this eﬀect is not
due to time preferences. However, as Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue, education could lower
the discount rate, making people more patient. This is yet another indirect mechanism that could
explain my results.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that there is a large causal eﬀect of education on mortality. While GLS
estimates suggest that an additional year of education lowers the probability of dying in the next
10 years by approximately 1.3 percentage points, my results from the IV estimation show that
the eﬀect is perhaps much larger: at least 3.6 percentage points. However it is worth noting
that the OLS and the IV estimates are not statistically diﬀerent. Nonetheless the eﬀects are
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Evaluated at the mean (i.e for d=0.11) this eﬀect is about -0.003
23large. To better understand the impact of education, I calculate how this eﬀect translates into life
expectancy gains. I ﬁnd that in 1960, one more year of education increased life expectancy at age
35 by as much as 1.7 years (using the OLS estimate). This is a very large increase.
A few notes of caution on how to interpret these results for public policy purposes are neces-
sary. First, in order to make policy recommendations, we need to know more about the speciﬁc
mechanisms by which education aﬀects health. This paper analyzes the eﬀects of increasing ed-
ucation from relatively low initial levels. It is unclear what the eﬀects would be at higher initial
levels of education. The average education level for white Americans born in 1901 was at most
8.87 years.49 Today many developing countries, including most Latin American countries, have
average levels of education that are similar. This paper implies that more aggressive education
policies could dramatically increase adult longevity in such countries. But cost beneﬁta n a l y s i so f
such policies are extremely complex, since for example we do not know what the cost of increasing
education would be, or its eﬀectiveness. Questions such as these are beyond the scope of this
paper. But the results presented here suggests that the beneﬁts of education are large enough
that we need to consider education policies more seriously as a means to increase health, especially
in light of the fact that other factors, such as expenditures on health, have not been proven to be
very eﬀective.
This evidence that education increases life expectancy implies that the returns to education,
measured only in terms of earnings increases, substantially underestimate the true returns to
education. In view of the large magnitude of the eﬀect of education on health, it is clear that more
attention needs to be devoted to the pathways of inﬂuence. Existing models of the relationship
between education and health are very imprecise about the mechanisms through which education
operates on health.
49 This is the average education level of that cohort in 1960. Data for the entire population in 1901 does not
exist for the US, but the average was probably much lower.
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Appendix: Trends for Compulsory education and Child Labor laws 
Compulsory Attendance Laws   
 
Age at which must enter school (enter age) 
    
 States  1915  States 1928  States 1939 
6 0  2  2 
7 16  28  33 
8 25  17  13 
9 1  1  0 
Total 42  48  48 
 
 
Child Labor Laws 
 
Minimun age to get work permit (work age) 
    
States 1915  States 1928 States  1939 
12 2     
13 1     
14 38  42  32 
15 4  4  4 
16 0  2  12 
Total 45  48  48 
 
Continuation School Laws 
 
Have Continuation School Laws 
      
 States  1915  States 1928  States 1939 
0 36  20  19 
1 12  28  29 
Total 48  48  48 
 
Constructed Variable: Implicit number of years had to attend school 
 
Childcom = work age  - enter age 
      
 States  1915  States 1928  States 1939 
0 8     
4 1     
5 2  1   
6 21  15  9 
7 14  26  23 
8 2  5  7 
9     8 
10   1  1 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
   Census*  NEFS** 
Variables   Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
       
Individual   10-year death rate  0.106  0.136  0.254  0.435 
characteristics  Years of completed education  10.697  1.020  10.360  3.326 
 1970  Dummy  0.471  0.499     
  Female  0.517 0.500 0.540 0.498 
  Married  0.818 0.096 0.755 0.430 
 Live in North  0.255  0.369  0.214  0.410 
 Live  in  West  0.285 0.351 0.250 0.433 
 Live in South  0.159  0.227  0.269  0.444 
 Live in an urban area  0.685  0.122  0.526  0.499 
 Age  50.366  8.482  62.941  7.561 
  Born in 1901  0.029  0.167  0.039  0.193 
  Born in 1902  0.025  0.157  0.054  0.226 
  Born in 1903  0.028  0.166  0.056  0.230 
  Born in 1904  0.029  0.169  0.056  0.230 
  Born in 1905  0.031  0.174  0.061  0.239 
  Born in 1906  0.032  0.177  0.068  0.251 
  Born in 1907  0.033  0.180  0.055  0.227 
  Born in 1908  0.036  0.186  0.042  0.200 
  Born in 1909  0.036  0.187  0.025  0.155 
  Born in 1910  0.038  0.191  0.026  0.160 
  Born in 1911  0.039  0.193  0.027  0.161 
  Born in 1912  0.040  0.195  0.028  0.165 
  Born in 1913  0.042  0.200  0.028  0.165 
  Born in 1914  0.043  0.202  0.031  0.174 
  Born in 1915  0.044  0.205  0.033  0.178 
  Born in 1916  0.044  0.205  0.032  0.177 
  Born in 1917  0.044  0.206  0.034  0.182 
  Born in 1918  0.046  0.209  0.035  0.184 
  Born in 1919  0.047  0.213  0.041  0.198 
  Born in 1920  0.048  0.213  0.037  0.188 
  Born in 1921  0.048  0.214  0.038  0.192 
  Born in 1922  0.050  0.217  0.039  0.194 
  Born in 1923  0.049  0.216  0.034  0.182 
  Born in 1924  0.049  0.215  0.044  0.206 
  Born in 1925  0.050  0.217  0.036  0.187 
        
State-of-Birth    %  Urban  53.523 21.279 49.846 20.734 
Characteristics % Foreign  11.737  8.523  11.489  8.434 
 %  Black  8.983  11.901  10.108  13.652 
  % Employed in manufacturing  0.067  0.039  0.065  0.040 
  Annual  Manufacturing  wage  7161.911 1368.253 6971.696 1380.099 
  Value of farm per acre  540.048  276.353  549.371  292.371 
  Per capita number of doctors   0.001  0.000  0.0013  0.0003 
  Per capita education expenditures   96.474  42.142  86.305  44.411 
  Number of school buildings per sq. mile  0.174  0.090  0.173  0.092 
*N=4795, corresponding to cells defined at the gender, state-of-birth, and cohort. All means calculated 
using weights, where the weights are given by the number of observations in each cell. Monetary values 
are in 1982-84 dollars. ** N: 4554. Monetary values are in 1982-84 dollars 
    
Note: Figures 1 and 2 follow the same cohorts from  the 1960 census up to the 1980 census. 
In Figure 1 we can observe that that 10-year mortality increases with age: for older cohorts the number 
of individuals observed in 1980 is much smaller than in 1960 or 1970. 
In figure 2 we can see that the average level of education is higher in 1980 than in 1960 for all cohorts, 
suggesting that those who died in each cohort had bellow average levels of education.
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The 1960 and 1970 census are 1/100 random 
samples of the population, therefore the number 
of individuals in any given group is always 
observed with error.  Because of this sampling 
error the death rates for any given group are over-
estimated 50% of the time and underestimated 
50% of the time.  However, since the sampling is 
truly random, the observed death rates are 
consistent estimates of the true death rates.  
If the true death rate is 0 then I observe 50% 
negative death rates. As cohorts age, the death 
rate increases (see example above) the number 
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TABLE 2: EFFECT OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION LAWS ON EDUCATION 
 
Variables    Individual data  Individual data  Aggregate data
 
Dependent  Variable  Education     
Education Laws  Childcom Category 4
(a)     0.347**     0.355**  0.323** 
   (0.075)    (0.088)  (0.077) 
  Childcom Category 5     0.323**     0.260**  0.321** 
    (0.090) (0.099) (0.098) 
  Childcom Category 6     0.274**     0.302**  0.266** 
   (0.069)  (0.087)  (.074) 
  Childcom Category 7     0.385**     0.408**  0.369** 
    (0.070) (0.087) (0.074) 
  Childcom Category 8     0.416**     0.398**  0.315** 
    (0.075) (0.089) (0.078) 
  Childcom Category 9     0.580**     0.512**  0.470** 
    (0.076) (0.092) (0.084) 
  Childcom Category 10     0.325**     0.328**  0.318** 
  (0.080) (0.095) (0.095) 
  Continuation School Required (=1)  0.027  0.017  0.027 
  (0.026) (0.028) (0.031) 
Individual   Female     0.116**     0.140**  -0.012 
characteristics  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
  Married       0.433**  -1.111** 
   (0.011)  (0.097) 
  Live in an urban area       0.968**  0.278** 
   (0.019)  (0.138) 
State-of-Birth   % Urban       0.021**  0.028** 
Characteristics   (0.004)  (0.005) 
 %  Foreign    -0.002  0.004 
   (0.008)  (0.010) 
  % Black       0.024**  0.020** 
   (0.009)  (0.010) 
  % Employed in manufacturing    -0.350  -1.220** 
   (0.513)  (0.621) 
 Annual  Manufacturing  wage   0.000  0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Value of farm per acre    0.000  0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Per capita number of doctors        150.018**  188.615** 
   (71.840)  (66.2) 
  Per capita education expenditures     0.001**  0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Number of school buildings per sq. mile    -0.359  -0.166 
   (0.289)  (0.373) 
  3 region of residence dummies  No  Yes  Yes 
  Region of birth*cohort dummies  No  Yes  Yes 
 R-Squared  0.0811  0.1052  0.888 
  F-statistic on instruments     14.93**     8.37**  4.49** 
  Partial  R-squared  0.0003 0.0001 0.0108 
 * significant at 10% ** significant at 5%.  All regressions include a dummy for the 1970 census, state-
of-birth dummies, cohort dummies and an intercept. For the individual-level regressions (1 and 2) 
N=814805 and the standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state-of-birth and cohort level.  
(a) Childcom=work  permit  age  - entry age. Childcom=0 is the excluded category. 
(b)  Data aggregated by gender/cohort/state-of-birth. Robust standard errors. N=4792    
 
 
TABLE 3: EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON MORTALITY-LEAST SQUARE RESULTS 
 
Variables            
Data   Census  NHEFS  NHEFS  NHEFS  NHEFS 
Method   WLS OLS  Probit
(a) WLS  W  LS 
Level
(d)   Aggregate











death rate  
75-85 
death rate  
75-85 
           
Individual   Education  -0.012**  -0.012**  -0.011**  -0.017**  -0.013** 
characteristics   (0.004) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
 Female  -0.048**  -0.147**  -0.151** -0.137**  -0.139** 
    (0.004) (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.030) 
 Married  0.227**  -0.044**  -0.053  -0.005  -0.015 
   (0.030)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.030)  (0.037) 
  Live in an urban area  -0.136**  0.037**  0.039**  0.056**  0.080** 
   (0.044)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.030) 
            
State-of-Birth   % Urban  0.000  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002 
Characteristics   (0.001) (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
 %  Foreign  0.000  0.005  0.012  0.005  0.005 
   (0.002) (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
 %  Black  0.000  -0.014*  -0.012  -0.014  -0.014 
   (0.002) (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
  % Employed in manufacturing  -0.075  -0.085  -0.060  -0.091  -0.100 
   (0.105) (0.590)  (0.563)  (0.621)  (0.640) 
 Annual  Manufacturing  wage  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Value of farm per acre  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Per capita number of doctors   -2.043  1.058  17.451  -0.762  -2.139   
   (14.384) (48.228)  (39.746)  (49.833)  (52.857) 
  Per capita education expenditures   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  # of school buildings per sq. mile  0.045  0.712**  0.744**  0.725**  0.758** 
   (0.064) (0.345)  (0.334)  (0.360)  (0.380) 
            
 N  4792  4554  4554  1557  942 
 R-Squared  0.3685  0.1736    0.3952  0.5219 
All regressions include 24 cohort dummies, 47 state of birth dummies, region-of-birth * cohort, region 
of residence dummies and an intercept. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state-of-birth 
and cohort level. The census regressions also include a dummy for the 1970 census. 
(a)  The reported coefficients are the mean marginal effects. The standard errors are calculated using 
the Delta Method.  
(b)  Data are aggregated at the cohort/gender and  state-of-birth level.  
(c)  Data aggregated at the cohort and state-of-birth level only. 
(d)  All regressions at the aggregate level are weighted by the number of observations in the original 
cell 
 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%.  
    
TABLE 4: EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON MORTALITY-IV RESULTS 
Variables          





Method   2SLS  Wald  2SLS  Mixed  2SLS
Level   Individual  Aggregate Aggregate  Aggregate 
Dependent 
Variable 








        
        
Individual   Education  -0.020  -0.037**  -0.045*  -0.059** 
characteristics  (0.054) (0.006)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
 1970  Dummy    0.003  0.012**  0.021** 
     (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
 Female  -0.142**  -0.071**  -0.048**  -0.040** 
   (0.030)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
 Married  -0.040    0.190**  0.266** 
 (0.027)    (0.041)  (0.031) 
  Live in an urban area  0.046    -0.126**  -0.080 
 (0.055)    (0.045)  (0.054) 
          
State-of-Birth   % Urban  -0.002    0.001  0.001 
Characteristics  (0.005)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
 %  Foreign  0.005    0.001  0.001 
  (0.007)   (0.002)  (0.002) 
 %  Black  -0.014    0.001  0.001 
  (0.008)   (0.002)  (0.002) 
  % Employed in manufacturing  -0.089    -0.118  -0.080 
  (0.605)   (0.113)  (0.137) 
 Annual  Manufacturing  wage  0.000    0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Value of farm per acre  0.000    0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Per capita number of doctors   7.298    6.078  6.675 
  (62.347)   (15.337)  (17.31) 
  Per capita education expenditures   0.000    0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Number of school buildings per sq. mile  0.698**    0.051  0.044 
  (0.350)   (0.066)  (0.075) 
          
 State-of-birth  Dummies  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
  Region of Birth Dummies  No  Yes  No  No 
 Cohort  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Region-of-birth*cohort  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
  Region of residence dummies  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
 N  4554  1396  4792  4792 
All regressions include an intercept.  
(a)  Regressions are weighted by the number of observations in the original cell. 
(b)  Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state-of-birth and cohort level and have been 
corrected in the second stage. 
(c)  Note: P2SLS and aggregate 2SLS use data aggregated at the gender/cohort/state-of-birth. Wald 
uses data aggregated at the gender/cohort/region-of-birth/compulsory education laws level. 
 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%. 
    
TABLE 5: ADDITIONAL ESTIMATIONS 
 
A: Effect of education on mortality: 
Quarter of birth, laws and interactions used as instruments 
 
   2SLS  Mixed  2SLS 
Dependent 
Variable 
10-year death rate     
    
Individual   Education  -.067**     -.062**    
   (.0260)  (.024) 
 
 
B: Effect of compulsory schooling on education:  




10-year death rate   
   
 Childcom  -0.0027** 
   (0.0013) 
  Continuation school   -0.0032 
   (0.005) 
 
 
C: Effect of education on mortality: Results corrected for Age Heaping:  
(Exclude ages 40, 50, and 60)  
 
   2SLS  Mixed  2SLS 
Dependent 
Variable 
10-year death rate     
    
Individual   Education  -.040  -.052 
   (.026)  (.026) 
 
D: Effect of education on mortality:  
Results by region of birth 
 
Dependent Variable10-
year death rate 
2SLS Mixed  2SLS 
    





South  -0.044 











    
 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%.     
TABLE 6: EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON MORTALITY-IV RESULTS BY GENDER 
 
    2SLS  2SLS  Mixed 2SLS  Mixed 2SLS 
Variables   Males  Females  Males Females 
Dependent 
Variable 
10-year death rate         
        
Individual   Education  -0.047  -0.044  -0.077  -0.054 
characteristics   (0.051)  (0.063)  (0.040)  (0.039) 
 Married  -0.292**  -0.311**  -0.263**  -0.297** 
  (0.082) (0.059)  (0.087)  (0.065) 
 Dummy  for  1970  0.025  -0.057**  0.032**  -0.052** 
 (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.011) 
  Live in an urban area  -0.096  -0.102  -0.002  -0.036 
  (0.059) (0.067)  (0.079)  (0.078) 
          
State-of-Birth   % Urban  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Characteristics  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 %  Foreign  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
 %  Black  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
  % Employed in manufacturing  -0.095  -0.128  -0.056  -0.103 
  (0.328) (0.264)  (0.182)  (0.194) 
 Annual  Manufacturing  wage  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Value of farm per acre  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Per capita number of doctors   22.270  -6.219  27.940  -5.860 
  (24.002) (32.441)  (22.782)  (26.29) 
  Per capita education expenditures   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Number of school buildings per sq. mile  -0.018  0.078  -0.057  0.094 
  (0.148) (0.155)  (0.103)  (0.106) 
          
 N  2397  2395  2397  2395 
All regressions include 24 cohort dummies, 47 state-of-birth dummies, region-of-birth * cohort 
interactions, region-of-residence dummies and an intercept. All regressions are weighted by the number 
of observations in the original cell. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust. 
 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%.  
 
 
    
TABLE 7: IS THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION ONLY THROUGH INCOME OR OCCUPATION?  
 
Dependent Variable: 10-year death rate     
Method 2SLS  Mixed-2SLS 
    
Education only (from table 4)    
    
Education -0.045*  -0.059** 
(0.026) (0.027) 
  
Education and income    
    
Education -0.046*  -0.051** 
(0.027) (0.023) 
Family Income  -1.00e-06**     -9.79e-07**   
 2.32e-07  2.33e-07 
    
Education, Income and occupation dummies    












































All regressions include controls for all variables included in previous estimations (see Table 4). All 
regressions are weighted by the number of observations in the original cell. Standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the state-of-birth and cohort level. Estimated using census data aggregated  
at the gender/state-of-birth/cohort level. N=4792 
Note: Total Family income: Mean 16647.16, S.E. 14280. (*)Occupation not available is  the left-out 
category  
 
 
 